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CONSUMER CHAPTER 7 CASES
Marianne B. Culhane and Michaela M. White'
I. INTRODUCrION
On November 15, 2001, at the Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy
Conference held at Fordham University School of Law, we
addressed the topic of reaffirmation. Reaffirmation means making
a new contract to pay and retain personal liability on a debt that
would otherwise be discharged in Chapter 72 While unsecured
debts may be reaffirmed, debtors more often reaffirm to persuade
a secured creditor to let them keep collateral. We will look at
reaffirmation in that aspect, as one of several Chapter 7 collateral
retention tools.
Many consumer debtors come into Chapter 7 with a heavy load
of secured debt on their cars and household goods.' Those who own
homes carry big mortgages as well. These secured claims, plus
exemptions, often leave no value for unsecured creditors, causing the
trustee to abandon the collateral. After the discharge removes the
debtors' personal liability, the liens remain attached to the collateral.'
and when the stay ends, the secured creditors may repossess!
1. Professors of Law, Creighton University Law School.
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 707 et seq. (2000).
3. See Marianne Culhane & Michaela White, Debt After Discharge, An
Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 709, 738-44, 748-50 (1999).
This study was funded by grants from the Endowment for Education of the National
Council of Bankruptcy Judges, the Bankruptcy Section of the Nebraska State Bar
Association, and Creighton University.
4. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991); see also Long v.
Bullard, 117 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1886).
5. See In Re Boodrow, 192 B.R. 57, 60 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1995).
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Repossession is not always what a secured creditor wants,
however. Often, the creditor hopes the debtor will keep the
collateral, and continue paying for it.' After all, if the creditor
retakes and sells a car or refrigerator, the creditor will recover only a
low liquidation value. When the debtor keeps the asset, however,
the creditor may collect much more from the debtor than
repossession would yield. Consumer creditors are frequently
undersecured. A few years ago, for example, an auto finance
executive told the Reporter for the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission that new car loans were undersecured by an average of
$4,000.7 Such shortfalls are a powerful incentive to seek retention
payments rather than settle for repossession and liquidation value.
Not surprisingly, many creditors routinely pursue retention
arrangements.
The debtor's wish may coincide with the creditor's hope.' Often,
the debtor is the person with the highest and best use for consumer
collateral.9 Allowing the debtor to retain collateral prevents lost
value, and the secured creditor is better off if the debtor pays more
for retention than liquidation value.
Professor William Whitford developed the concept of varying
values of the same collateral to debtors and creditors more than
twenty years ago. Assume a Chapter 7 debtor owns a car, several
6. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small Business
Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 1, 15-20 (1997) (describing the ineffectiveness of repossession
and liquidation of collateral in the context of small business borrowers); RICHARD
HYNES & ERIc POSNER, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF CONSUMER FINANCE 10-11
(Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 117, 2001); Barry Adler et al.,
Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585,
586 (2000) (arguing that continued payments exceed value of liquidation even more
so with consumers than with small businesses).
7. Professor Elizabeth Warren served as Reporter to the NBRC, and she is the
source for this information. Professor Warren says the executive promised
(threatened) to deny saying it if his or her name were revealed. See e-mail from
Elizabeth Warren to Michaela White (Dec. 12, 1999) (on file with the Fordham
Journal of Corporate & Financial Law).
8. See William C. Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit Collection
System, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 1047, 1060 (1979); see also William C. Whitford, The
Appropriate Role of Security Interests in Consumer Transactions, 7 CARDOZo L.
REv. 959, 961-64 (1986).
9. See generally Whitford, supra note 8.
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years old, but in decent condition, subject to a $10,000 lien. Assume
further that repossession would net the creditor only $6,000. The
debtor needs a car to get to work, is familiar with this car's quirks,
and knows that if it were lost, she would have to replace it at retail
price, with all the hassle and time off work that used-car shopping
entails. Thus, she values the car at much more than $6000. She may
fear that no one would give her credit to buy another car soon after
bankruptcy. These fears may cause the debtor to overvalue
retention, leading her to agree to pay too much, that is, more than
replacement cost or more than she can afford.
Professor Barry Adler and his co-authors recently explored the
same hypothesis, using slightly different terminology. They agree
that typical consumer collateral has two values, value to the debtor
(AD) and liquidation value to the market (AM). Whenever
AD>AM, both the debtor and society realize a surplus (AD - AM) if
the debtor retains the asset. The surplus is lost entirely if the creditor
repossesses."0
Certainly, retention may be in the debtor's best interest, but only
under three conditions: 1) she needs the asset for her fresh-start life;
2) retention will cost no more than she would have to pay to replace
the asset, and 3) she can afford the cost to retain. If the debtor does
not need the collateral or binds herself to pay too much, retention
will frustrate, rather than further, Chapter 7's central goal: the fresh
start. The debtor and her family may suffer prolonged financial
hardship, and the economy may lose the fresh start's productivity
enhancement.1
A central goal of Chapter 7 is to grant individuals a fresh start.
The fresh start of course helps the debtor and her family, but its
impact does not stop there. Relieving the debtor benefits the rest of
society by reviving the debtor's incentive to work and participate
productively in the economy. An overburdened debtor foreseeing
only wage slavery, year upon year of losing most income to prior
creditors, has little incentive to work. She and her family may
become public charges or even turn to crime. On the other hand, a
10. Adler et al., supra note 6.
11. See id. at 600; see also Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934);
Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1047, 1059-63 (1987).
2002]
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debtor who expects to retain most of her wages will work to earn,
and the long-term benefit to society will outweigh the loss to
creditors. As Professor Adler and his co-authors have said, "[S]ome
observers may find [these benefits] sufficiently compelling to
outweigh the virtues of freedom of contract." 2
Recognizing these dangers, Congress has limited freedom of
contract for retention in Chapter 7. However, recent empirical
evidence 3 and hearings before the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission 4 indicate that Chapter 7's retention provisions do not
adequately protect the fresh start."5  Debtors frequently bind
themselves to pay more than they can afford and more than
replacement cost." While the Code expects debtor's counsel to
protect the debtor in retention negotiations, debtor's counsel are
sometimes unwilling and may have too little information to counter
their client's wishes and the creditor's leverage. Also, the law on
retention in Chapter 7 is not uniform across the nation. 7 More
retention tools are available in some circuits than in others.
This Article will argue that retention of collateral by Chapter 7
debtors ought to be facilitated, but only where retention will
further the fresh start and yield creditors more than liquidation
value. Part I will review Chapter 7's current retention tools, and
examine their shortcomings. Part II will discuss provisions of the
2001 House and Senate Bills, which would increase creditor control
and raise the price of retention in Chapter 7. Part III will suggest
an alternative plan to better protect the fresh start by reducing
both the cost and creditor control of retention.
Our focus here is on Chapter 7. Some may argue that debtors
who wish to retain assets should do so in Chapter 13. However,
helping Chapter 7 debtors retain assets is necessary, despite Chapter
12. Adler et al., supra note 6, at 600.
13. See Cuihane & White, supra note 3, at 709.
14. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT 146-47,
152-55, available at http://www.abiworld.org/legis/review/ (last visited Feb. 20,
2002).
15. See generally Culhane & White, supra note 3 (indicating that abuse of the
reaffirmation process threatens two goals of Chapter 7; "the fresh start for honest
debtors and equitable treatment for law-abiding creditors").
16. Id.
17. See infra note 29.
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13's wide array of property retention tools. Most Chapter 7 debtors
could not repay much unsecured debt in any reasonable time, and so
belong in Chapter 7. Empirical evidence suggests that most filers
would remain in Chapter 7 even if a mechanical means-test were to
be substituted for current Section 707(b).'" Debtors with too little
income to succeed in Chapter 1319 may still be able to pay a fair price
for some needed collateral. Permitting that to happen in Chapter 7,
when the debtor has the highest and best use for the property,2
benefits not only the debtor but also her secured creditors and the
economy as a whole.
Further, using asset retention as an incentive to file Chapter 13
has not necessarily resulted in much payment to unsecured creditors,
especially when the administrative costs to collect are considered.
18. See, e.g., Marianne Culhane & Michaela White, Taking the New Consumer
Bankruptcy Model for a Test Drive: Means-Testing Real Chapter 7 Debtors, 7 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 27,31 (1999) (stating that only 3.6% of a sample of Chapter 7
debtors would have been barred from Chapter 7 by means-testing in 1997's
proposed bankruptcy reform legislation). The article cites several other empirical
studies by Ernst & Young for VISA. Id These studies found that 15% (later
amended to 11%), of a different sample of Chapter 7 debtors would have been
barred. Id. at 29-30. For a summary and critique of these studies, see GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY: ANALYSIS OF FOUR REPORTS ON
CHAP ER 7 DEBTOR'S ABILITY TO PAY (June 1999).
Professor Jean Braucher, in her Murphy Conference article, suggested that a
better and much simpler means-test might be based on the Australian model, which
requires debtors to pay unsecured creditors, over a three-year period, a sizeable
portion of one year's above-median income. See Jean Braucher, Means Testing
Consumer Bankruptcy: The Problem of Means, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 407
(2002). She also indicated that the Australian experience was that only 3-5% of
debtors fell within that requirement. Id
19. While Chapter 13 is a favorite of Congress and some judges, most Chapter
13 debtors fail to finish their plans. See, e.g., NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REvIEw
COMMISSION, BANKRUPTCY: THE NExT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT 90 (E.
Warren, Rep., 1997) [hereinafter NBRC REPORT] (stating that in only 32% of
Chapter 13 cases are payments completed); William C. Whitford, The Ideal of
Individualized Justice:' Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection and
Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 397, 410 (1994).
20. See Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests in Consumer
Transactions, supra note 8, at 963.
21. Figures from the Executive Office for United States Trustees indicate that
general unsecured creditors as a group received 18-22% of total Chapter 13
disbursements in 1998-2000. Gordon Bermant & Ed Flynn, Chapter 13
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The retention incentives too often lead instead to plans where all
payments go to secured creditors, or to strategic use by debtors who
access Chapter 13 just long enough to cure an arrearage on a house
and then dismiss their case. Professor Braucher has wisely said that
Chapter 13 might better be left to debtors who really want to pay
unsecured debt under court supervision.' To that group could be
added the minority of debtors with so much disposable income that
they are required to pay unsecured creditors as the price of a
discharge.
II. CHAPTER 7's CURRENT RETENTION TooLs
Current Chapter 7 law and practice offer three routes to retain
collateral after discharge: redemption, ride-through and
reaffirmation. 24
Disbursements in Fiscal Year 2000: Steady Growth, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 21
(Nov. 2001). The average total per case paid to general unsecured creditors was
$1787 in 1998 and $2182 in 2000. Id.; see also, Scott Norberg, Consumer
Bankruptcy's New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in
Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. L. REv. 415, 418 (1999). "In half of the cases... the
debtors paid only slightly more than the Chapter 13 filing fee in unsecured debt ....
[U]nsecured creditors in more than 75% of the cases collected less than the
typical... debtor's attorney fee." Id. at 418. Professor Norberg's study cited above
was limited to a single federal judicial district. Hie is currently working on an
ambitious multi-district study of Chapter 13.
22. See, e.g., In re Greer, 60 B.R. 547, 554 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (confirming
Chapter 13 plan that pays nothing to unsecured creditors).
23. Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means-
Testing as a Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Report
as a Starting Point, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 1, 22(1998).
24. One additional route to retention in Chapter 7 is lien avoidance under 11
U.S.C. § 522(f). 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (2000). That Section allows avoidance of some
judicial liens on all collateral and nonpossessory nonpurchase money liens on some
types of personal property, if these impair exemptions. Id. The Federal Trade
Commission regulation making it an unfair trade practice to take a nonpossessory
nonpurchase money security interest in certain household goods has somewhat
reduced the importance of § 522(f) as a device for avoiding security interests. See 16
C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (2001).
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A. Redemption
A debtor may redeem under Section 722, freeing up tangible
personal property purchased for household use.' Redemption
currently requires a lump-sum payment of the value of the collateral
or unpaid balance of the debt; whichever is less, within forty-five days
after the first meeting of creditors.26 The creditor has no veto power
here; it may only challenge the valuation. On the other hand, since
payment is certain, quick, and equal to expected liquidation value,
the creditor should be indifferent.
Of course, that same quick lump-sum payment requirement
means the Chapter 7 debtor may not be able to redeem a car or any
other big-ticket items. She probably could not raise so much cash so
soon. Our reaffirmation study confirmed that while the sample
debtors proposed on their Statements of Intention to retain 79% of
their encumbered cars, only 4% planned to do so by redemption. '
B. Ride-Thruh
If lump-sum redemption will not work for a debtor, she might
look into ride-through,' a judicially developed route to retention. In
four circuits, debtors who are current in payments and not otherwise
in default have a right to retain a house, car or other collateral by
continuing to make payments and otherwise fulfilling their original
contract. The lien will not be released until the debtor has paid the
25. 11 U.S.C. § 722.
26. See id. §§ 521(2)(B) & 722; see also In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir.
1990); In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983).
We understand that a debtor might be able to finance redemption with a
loan from a third party, and then repay that loan in installments. At least in 1995,
when the cases in our database were filed, however, that practice was apparently not
widespread.
27. See Culhane & White, supra note 3, at 739 (noting that the debtors proposed
on their Statements of Intention to surrender 21% of the cars subject to security
interests).
28. See, e.g., Mark R. Campbell & Robert C. Hastie, Executory Contracts:
Retention Without Assumption in Chapter 11 - "Ride-Through" Revisited, 19 AM.
BANKR. INST. J. 33 (2000).
29. For cases holding that debtors who are current have a right to ride-through,
that is, retain collateral without reaffirmation or redemption see In re Parker, 139
20021
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full contract price, but the ride-through debtor does not reinstate
personal liability." If the debtor quits making payments, the creditor
is limited to retaking the collateral. No deficiency judgment will be
allowed.
Except in those four circuits, however, debtors have no clear
right to impose ride-through on an unwilling creditor. Nevertheless,
some creditors allow it. Home mortgagees, for example, commonly
acquiesce in ride-through. Presumably the high value and low
mobility of real estate collateral, plus mortgage insurance3' and state
anti-deficiency laws make personal liability disposable to them.3"
Our research indicates that ride-through by creditor consent
may be very common for cars as well.33 'This is more surprising, for
F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Belanger,
962 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1992); In re Lowry Federal Credit Union, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th
Cir. 1989). Four other circuits hold that debtors have no right to ride-through
without creditor permission. See In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843 (1st Cir. 1998); see also In
re Johnson, 89 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512 (1lth Cir. 1993); In
re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383 (7th Cir. 1990).
30. In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383.
31. The importance of mortgage insurance was emphasized in the NBRC
Report stating, "[mlortgage insurance, not deficiency liability, furnishes security for
secondary market investors in shaky home mortgage markets." John Mixon & Ira
B. Shepard, Antideficiency Relief for Foreclosed Homeowners: USLIA Section
511(b), 27 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 455, 462 (1992), NBRC REPORT, supra note 19, at
243 n.627 (citing John Micon & Ira Shepar's article).
32. In our sample, debtors proposed to surrender or the stay was lifted on 25%
of the encumbered homes (including mobile homes). Culhane & White, supra note
3, at 744-48. Reaffirmation agreements were actually filed for less than 15% of the
homes, which leaves 60% as possible ride-throughs. Id. Mobile home lenders
apparently sought reaffirmation agreements much more often than other home
lenders. Id. Reaffirmation agreements were filed on only 6% of non-mobile homes,
but were filed on 31% of mobile homes. Id.
33. Id. at 739-40. Our sample debtors proposed on their Statements of
Intention to surrender 21% of the encumbered cars, and to retain the rest, almost
always by reaffirmation. However, reaffirmation agreements were filed on only
21% of the vehicles. If another 3 or 4% were redeemed, that leaves 55 % of the cars
as possible ride-throughs. Id.
Certainly, creditors may have waited until after discharge to repossess in
some of these cases, but it seems unlikely that they took that route for all or even
most of the cars the debtors wanted to retain and pay for. It is also unclear whether
auto lenders in 1995 openly allowed ride-through or required debtors to sign
reaffirmation agreements, which the lenders failed to file with the court, as required
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anti-deficiency laws usually do not cover cars,"' and the high mobility
and rapid depreciation of vehicles might lead a lender to value
personal liability.
C. Reaffirmation
Ride-through is not available to debtors who are in default or
who live in the wrong circui 5 and have a creditor who objects. As
we have seen, redemption will often be useless as well. 6 For many
debtors, that leaves reaffirmation as the only route to retention.
Reaffirmation under Section 524(c) means making a new contract on
whatever terms the creditor imposes, for reaffirmation requires the
creditor's agreement. Creditors can and often do hold out for more
than the original contract price." Unlike redemption or ride-
through, the reaffirmation agreement renews the debtor's personal
liability as well, so she faces not only repossession but also judgment
and wage garnishment if she cannot make the promised payments.
Due to the unequal bargaining power among the parties, there is
a real danger the debtor will agree to pay too much. In a desperate
attempt to keep the car, she may rush into a burdensome contract.
Experience under the Act of 1898"9 showed that creditors
aggressively pursued debtors for reaffirmations, and debtors all too
by Bankruptcy Code § 524(c). In either case, the debtor's personal liability would
not have been reinstated, so the debtors were de facto riding through.34. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (2001) (providing that anti-
deficiency law applies only to loans secured by real property or a mix of real and
personal property).
35. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
36. See Culhane & White, supra note 3, at 739.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2000).
38. Creditors add attorneys' fees and other costs to reaffirmation agreements.
See, e.g., In re Pendlebury, 94 B.R. 120 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988). The recent case of In
re Jamo is a more extreme example. In re Jamo, 262 B.R. 159 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2001).
The First Circuit did not recognize a right to ride through, so the debtors told their
creditor they wanted to reaffirm their home mortgage. Id. The creditor said it
would not agree unless the debtors also reaffirmed $24,000 of unsecured debt, and
repeatedly threatened foreclosure. Id. The First Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel found that holding the house hostage for reaffirmation of the unsecured debt
violated the automatic stay. Id.
39. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
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often reaffirmed beyond their ability to repay, nullifying the fresh
start.4°
Congress recognized that danger in the Bankruptcy Code, and
set limits on reaffirmation. The agreement must be in writing, made
before discharge, and filed with the court.4' The writing must disclose
the debtor's right to rescind, which lasts until the later of discharge or
sixty days after the agreement is filed with the court. '2 The time
limits and filing requirement are intended to help the debtor's lawyer
and the court protect the debtor from the creditor's leverage. The
Code makes debtor's counsel the gatekeeper of reaffirmation, rather
than a mere adviser to the client. Counsel are to review each
reaffirmation, and then approve and certify only those agreements
that do "not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent
of the debtor." 3 If the debtor is pro se, the court is to take on this
role, approving reaffirmations only if they meet the undue hardship
standard and are "in the best interest of the debtor."" If counsel or
the court refuses to approve, the reaffirmation agreement is not
legally binding.
Despite these limits, debtors sign and counsel approve many ill-
advised reaffirmations. First, the empirical evidence is that debtors
often bind themselves to pay more than they can afford. The median
net income of debtors who reaffirmed one or more debts was only
$19,740.46 Even if we exclude both housing reaffirmations and
interest costs, these debtors still reaffirmed an average of $4670, or
24% of their net income.' 7 Worse still, the income and expense
schedules showed that more than half of these debtors had no money
left or even a monthly deficit after non-housing reaffirmation
40. See 1973 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 116; see also DAVID STANLEY &
MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS, REFORM 61-62 (Brookings
Institute 1971).
41. 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c)(1) & (3).
42 Id. § 524(c).
43. Id. § 524(c)(6)(A)(i).
44. Id. § 524(c)(6)(A)(ii).
45. Id. §§ 524(c)(3) & (6).
46. Culhane & White, supra note 3, at 762.
47. Id. at 754.
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payments.'
Nevertheless, counsel approved 97% of the reaffirmations in the
case files.49 Perhaps counsel believed that running a deficit is less of a
hardship than losing a car or mobile home, and thus is not "undue."
Several recent decisions provide support for such thinking and hold
that where the reaffirmation is before the court for a determination
of whether it poses an undue hardship and is in the best interests of
the debtor, the analysis is not solely a function of a debtor's income
and expenses.' Perhaps reaffirmation is the lesser of two evils.
However, unless the figures mislead (which they may) or income has
increased, most of these debtors will soon miss payments and lose the
asset, if it is worth repossessing, or have to forego food and rent
payments to cover reaffirmation costs.
If the payment does not immediately bust the budget, it may still
burden the fresh start. Debtors sign and counsel approve
reaffirmations at very high interest rates with amortization periods
longer than the likely useful life of the collateral." For example, one
sample debtor agreed to make seventy-four more monthly payments
on a four-year old car, while another committed to fifty-four more
payments on a five-year old car. 52 With interest at 19.65%, finance
charges would add $6,700 to the $13,000 principal.3 A debtor will
4& Id. at 760.
49. Id. at 759.
50. See BankBoston, N.A. v. Nanton, 239 B.R. 419, 425-26 (D. Mass. 1999). In
Nanton the district court held that the debtor's Schedules I and J (showing a
monthly deficit) raised only a prima facie concern about her ability to pay.
While the standards of "undue hardship" and "best interest" may involve an
evaluation of debtor's ability to pay, they may possibly implicate several other
factors, including 1) what alternatives, other than reaffirmation, are available to a
debtor who wishes to retain an interest in property, 2) whether the underlying debt
is secured or unsecured, 3) if the debt is secured, the threat of repossession of and
the amount of equity in the collateral, and the extent to which the collateral is a
necessity to the Debtor, see Melendez, 224 B.R. at 259 n.9 & 260, and 4) the debtor's
payment history on the collateral. Nanton, 239 B.R. at 425-26; accord, In re Claflin,
249 B.R. 840, 847 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000); In re Strong, 232 B.R. 921,924 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1999).
51. Culhane & White, supra note 3, at 757-58.
52. Id. at 756-57.
53. The NBRC Report cited an even more egregious example: "The agreement
committed (the debtors) to repay a loan on a pickup truck that cost $18,027 ... over
20021
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have a hard time replacing her car if she still owes thousands of
dollars of reaffirmation payments on it when it foreseeably wears
out.
Apparently debtors and counsel too often look only for an "easy
monthly payment," ignoring the total financial burden. One reason
the total financial burden may be ignored is that the Truth-in-
Lending Act's standardized disclosure rules do not apply to
reaffirmation agreements. Many of the agreements sampled did not
disclose amortization period, total finance charges or total cost.55
When the debtor and her counsel do not even know how much she
binds herself to pay, it is easy to over commit.
Another indication that the fresh start is not well protected by
the current Code is the high number of reaffirmations of debt that for
all practical purposes is unsecured.56 The most common use of
reaffirmation in our sample was not to retain a home or car, but
rather to bind the debtor to repay a retailer's claim secured by
household goods. 7 To be sure, some household goods, such as
artwork, antiques, jewelry, major appliances, and electronics, may be
worth repossessing if a debtor does not pay to retain them. Very
often, however, household goods are of low initial value, depreciate
quickly, and because they are kept inside a home, must be retaken by
replevin rather than less expensive self-help. In essence, the goods
have little or no net liquidation value, and generally would not be
repossessed. Reaffirmation of this household goods debt, usually at
fifteen years. With compounded interest, the debtors would pay a total of
$42,861.84. [When asked about] the length of the payout, the [debtor's] attorney
admitted overlooking that fact." Id. at 756 (quoting NBRC REPORT, supra note 19,
at 155).
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. (2000). Regulation Z exempts changes in credit
terms that are due to "an agreement involving a court proceeding." 12 C.F.R. §
226.20(a)(3) (2001). Federal Reserve Staff Interpretations extend this exemption to
reaffirmation agreements. Truth in Lending, 46 F.R. 50288 (Oct. 9, 1981) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
55. Culhane & White, supra note 3, at 754.
56. Id. at 764.
57. Almost half to all the reaffirmation agreements in our sample were for
household goods; they exceeded in number the combined total for homes and cars.
Id. The average principal amount for household goods reaffirmations is $1060. Id
The interest rates on these averaged 19%, with often undisclosed six to eight-year
payout periods. Id. at 748-51.
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interest rates equal to those for completely unsecured debt, may not
be in the debtor's interest or even necessary for retention.
Retailers actively solicit reaffirmation of such debts using offers
of post-bankruptcy credit as a lure in addition, often, to deceptive
threats of repossession." The effective cost of a few hundred dollars
of new credit, purchased at the cost of reaffirming a thousand dollars
or more of such nominally secured debt, is extremely high. Post-
bankruptcy credit would likely be available to the debtor on much
more favorable terms from other sources. But debtors may not
believe this and counsel too often approve such unfavorable deals.
Another problem is the willingness of some creditors to evade
the oversight required by the Code. Some creditors approach even
represented debtors directly, through the mail or just before or after
§ 341 meetings,59 getting debtors to sign reaffirmation agreements
that the creditor neither files with the court nor discloses to debtor's
counsel. '  While these rogue reaffirmations are not legally
enforceable, the debtor may believe she is bound and try to pay.
Sears and other national retailers" admitted in 1997 and 1998 to
failing to file tens of thousands of reaffirmation agreements with the
courts.' The NBRC's investigation of unfiled reaffirmations led
58. For discussion of Sears' reaffirmation practices, including offers of new
credit and deceptive threats of repossession, see In re Melendez, 224 B.R. 252,
265-66 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) [hereinafter Melendez I].
59. 11 U.S.C. § 341. A § 341 meeting is a meeting of creditors convened by
the United States trustee that the court may not attend. Id. Prior to the
conclusion of a § 341 meeting, the debtor must be questioned to determine that
the debtor understands the implications of filing for bankruptcy, including the
consequences of reaffirmation. Id.
60. Culhane & White, supra note 3, at 717.
61. Some other major consumer creditors which admitted failing to file
reaffirmation agreements with bankruptcy courts are GE Credit (parent of
Montgomery Ward), May Department Stores, Federated Department Stores and
Discover Card. See John Roddy, Remedies for Systematic Violations of the
Bankruptcy Discharge, 2 CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES LrrIG. 801, 803 (1999).
62. Sears entered into multimillion-dollar settlements of class action suits and
paid a criminal fine of $60 million to the U.S. Justice Department. Other retailers
entered consent decrees with the Federal Trade Commission. For more on these
stories, see Bamaby J. Feder, The Harder Side of Sears, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1997 at
Sec. 3 p. 1; see also Briefly: Retailing Sears in New Battle Over Debt Collection, L.A.
TIMES, June 12, 1999; John Roddy, Flawed Judgment The Risks of Collecting
Discharged Debt, in 1997 CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LMGATION 631-32 (PLI
4832002]
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them to believe that only half of the reaffirmation agreements
debtors signed and believed themselves bound by were ever filed
with the courts.63
Professional responsibility may demand," and the current Code
seems to assume,65 that debtor's counsel can and will actively
negotiate with the creditor on price and other terms, then stand firm
against both creditor and client and refuse to approve when the cost
is too high. Ideally, counsel would also be fully acquainted with retail
replacement costs and sources of post-bankruptcy credit, good at
amortization math, and familiar from beginning to end of each case
with the client's income and expenses." Finally, counsel should be
Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook, Series No. B7-7188, 1997); Melendez I,
224 B.R. at 261-64.
63. NBRC REPORT, supra note 19, at 163.
64. A number of courts assert the power to override approval of reaffirmations
by debtor's counsel. See BankBoston N.A. v. Nanton, 239 B.R. 419 (D. Mass. 1999)
(listing cases on both sides of the issue); see also In re Vargas, 257 B.R. 157 (Bankr.
D. N.J. 2001); In re Collins, 243 B.R. 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000); In re Melendez,
235 B.R. 173 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1999) [hereinafter "Melendez /"]; In re Lindley, 216
B.R. 811 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1998); Melendez I, 224 B.R. 252 (Bankr. D. Mass 1998); In
re Turner, 208 B.R. 434 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1997); In re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. 444 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. 382 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996).
These courts locate the source of their authority to review such
reaffirmations and monitor debtors' attorneys' compliance with Section 524(c) in
Section 105 and Bankruptcy Rule of Procedure 9011. See, e.g., In re Vargas, 257
B.R. at 165-66; Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 188-190; Melendez I, 224 B.R. at 259-60; In
re Bruzzese, 214 B.R. at 450; In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. at 386. Review is authorized
under Section 105 because it allows the court to make any determination and take
any action to ensure compliance with the Code, including the statutory predicates to
a valid reaffirmation under Section 524(c). Moreover, Bankruptcy Rule 9011
(making FED. R. Civ. P. 11 applicable to bankruptcy proceedings) authorizes review
of such agreements in order to monitor the conduct of the debtors' attorneys who
may file pleadings or other papers with the court without an adequate factual
foundation. I.
65. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 455, 98 Stat. 333, 354, 376 (amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c) & (d)
(2000)).
66. In Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 203, the Court summarized the minimum
obligations of debtor's counsel before certifying that the debtor has been fully
informed of the legal effect and consequences of a reaffirmation agreement and any
default thereunder as follows:
At a minimum, debtor's counsel must:
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able to teach debtors how to budget and plan for the future.67
Some counsel fulfill all this and more, but too many do not, and
the economics of the practice make it unlikely that they will soon
reach the desired level. First, attorney fees for Chapter 7 cases are
usually low; often well below $1000. If the attorney is a bankruptcy
specialist, the practice may depend on high volume, which necessarily
limits time spent on any one case. Active negotiation, with offers and
counteroffers, happens too seldom. Second, the debtor may fear
repossession and inability to replace collateral, leading her to insist
on reaffirmation. The attorney may be unable to quell those fears,
and so acquiesces." Third, some creditors use groundless threats of
(2) review the security agreement, charge slips, payment history and other
documentation constituting the security interest claimed by the creditor in
order to verify the amount of the creditor's claim, the validity, extent and
perfection of the alleged security interest and the non-avoidability of the
alleged lien under the Bankruptcy Code;
(3) question the value placed on the goods by the secured creditor and
independently estimate that value;
(4) evaluate the risk of replevy by the creditor, in light of the age, condition and
value of the goods versus the need of and cost to the debtor to retain the items
at risk; and demand a replevy decision from the secured creditor prior to
execution of the reaffirmation agreement;
(5) discuss relevant financial disclosures with the debtor;
(6) ensure that the agreement was entered into voluntarily and without creditor
misrepresentations or coercion;
(7) ensure that the debtor understands the effect and consequences of the
agreement and the consequences of default;
(8) ensure that the debtor is informed as to his or her options with respect to
the collateral under the Bankruptcy Code; and
(9) advise the debtor as to alternative sources of credit.
Melendez II, 235 B.R. at 203; accord, see, e.g., In re Vargas, 257 B.R. at 165-66; In re
Bruzzese, 214 B.R. at 452-55; In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. at 386-87.
67. Jean Braucher has examined in detail what truly competent representation
of Chapter 7 and 13 debtors requires. Her empirical work, however, indicates that
level of representation is too seldom reached. See Jean Braucher, Counseling
Consumer Debtors to Make Their Own Informed Choices - A Question of
Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. L. REv. 165, 174, 179-85 (1997).
68. Sears, for example, used to send each of its debtors a form reaffirmation
agreement that recited that the debtor wanted to reaffirm to settle discharge
litigation. In re Iappini, 192 B.R. 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995). In the vast majority of
such cases, the creditor had no grounds or intention to file a complaint for exception
to discharge. Id. Judge Hillman held that this language was "designed to entice the
Debtors to reaffirm an obligation and... [was] without good cause and hence ...
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discharge litigation to induce reaffirmation. While the debtor may
have a good defense, the costs of defending an adversary proceeding
are not usually included in the ordinary Chapter 7 attorney fee. The
prospects of having to pay for discovery and other defense costs, and
of possibly losing anyhow, are powerful incentives to settle by
reaffirmation."
In sum, while a debtor's retention of collateral is usually good
for her secured creditors, retention too often comes at the expense of
the debtor's fresh start. Redemption and ride-through are
unavailable to many debtors, and the creditor's control of
reaffirmation often leads debtors and their counsel to agree to
unreasonably high prices. This may lead to prolonged financial
problems for the debtor and her family, and perhaps repeated
bankruptcy filings.
III. RETENTION IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE BILLS
The House and Senate Bills" (the "Bills") propose some
changes to retention that generally increase creditor control of the
process, but also increase judicial oversight.
A. Redemption
While the Bills keep the lump-sum payment requirement for
Chapter 7 redemption, they would make redemption even less
affordable by raising the redemption price. Amending § 506's
definition of allowed secured claim would do this. 1 For Chapter 7
and 13 cases filed by individual debtors, personal property intended
for household use is to be valued at full retail replacement cost for
goods of like age and condition, without deduction for costs of sale or
made in bad faith." Id. He ordered Sears not to use that form for any future
reaffirmations in his court. Id.
69. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 19, at 173.
70. All references to the "Bills" are to the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, as passed by the House of
Representatives on March 1, 2001 and to S. 420, as passed by the Senate on
March 15, 2001.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2000).
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marketing." This is a higher measure of value than the Supreme
Court imposed in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash for
installment redemption in Chapter 13, 3 and substantially higher than
the liquidation value many courts continue to use post-Rash for
redemption under Section 722."4 Raising the price to redeem, while
retaining the lump-sum payment rule, would put redemption under
Section 722 even further out of reach for much collateral.
The Bills' redemption provisions also violate a central premise
of the collective process in bankruptcy whereby creditors who are
similarly situated are to be treated similarly. To the extent that full
retail replacement value exceeds the liquidation value of the
collateral, such creditors would receive greater dividends on the
unsecured component of their claims than other unsecured creditors.
B. Ride-Through
The Bills would overrule the four circuits that recognize a
debtor's right to retain collateral without redemption or
72 See § 327 of H.R. 333 and § 326 of S. 420, amending 11 U.S.C. § 506 by
adding new subsection (a)(2), which would provide:
(a)(2) In the case of an individual debtor under chapters 7 and 13, such value
with respect to personal property securing an allowed secured claim shall be
determined based on the replacement value of such property as of the date of
filing the petition without deduction for costs of sale or marketing. With
respect to property acquired for personal, family or household purpose,
replacement value shall mean the price a retail merchant would charge for
property of that kind, considering the age and condition of the property at the
time value is determined.
73. Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997). The proposed retail
replacement standard will result in higher prices than Rash would require, because
the Supreme Court, in Rash's famous footnote 6, suggested that retail might not
always be the valuation standard, and that even where retail was the appropriate
standard, deductions should be made for warranties and other services that the
retaining debtor would not receive. Id. at 965 n.6.
74. Many courts continue to value collateral for redemption under 11 U.S.C. §
722 at liquidation value, on the ground that a lump sum payment protects the
creditor from both the risks of debtor's default on the agreement and of
deterioration of the collateral. Installment redemption in Chapter 13, which was
before the Court in Rash, imposes both these risks on the creditor. See, e.g., In re
Donley, 217 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1998); In re Dunbar, 234 B.R. 895 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1999); In re Henderson, 235 B.R. 425 (Bankr. C.D. II. 1999).
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reaffirmation,"5 allowing ride-through only by creditor permission.76
That would provide a nationally uniform rule, unlike the present
division of the circuits, but would also increase creditor control of the
retention process. Debtors could no longer ride-through over a
creditor's objection.
The Bills assume that some home mortgagees, however, may
continue to permit ride-through. To protect these creditors from
charges of violating the discharge injunction, the Bills authorize
creditors with mortgages on "real estate that is the principal
residence of the debtor" to send bills and other ordinary course
communications to non-reaffirming debtors after discharge, if the
intent is to seek payments.77 The Bills make no similar exception for
post-discharge contacts with ride-through debtors for other types of
collateral.
C. Reaffirmation
Raising the redemption price and letting creditors control ride-
through means even more debtors would have to reaffirm to retain
their assets. The Bills would leave most of the current reaffirmation
requirements in place, but add new paperwork and judicial scrutiny.78
Debtor's counsel would still be gatekeepers, with the court acting for
unrepresented debtors.
Among the changes are requirements that the creditor give a
reaffirming debtor a lengthy disclosure statement, which would
include 1) the Annual Percentage Rate ("APR") and the Amount
Reaffirmed, 2) a list of the items of collateral and their original
purchase prices, and 3) brief statements of legal advice on
reaffirmation procedure and legal effect, in a Frequently Asked
Questions format.
While standardized disclosure of the APR is an improvement,
75. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
76. See §§ 304-05 of H.R. 333 and S. 420, amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 352 & 362.
77. See §§ 202 of H.R. 333 and S. 420, amending 11 U.S.C. § 524. Judge Sam
Bufford recently considered how secured creditors might deal with ride-through
debtors without violating either the automatic stay or the discharge injunction. See
In re Henry, 266 B.R. 457 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2001).
7& See supra note 70.
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the Bills do not make the Truth-in-Lending Act79 ("TIL") applicable
to reaffirmations. TIL's definition of Annual Percentage Rate
("APR") is simply imported into the Code.' Unfortunately, the
APR and the Amount Reaffirmed are the only required disclosures;81
there is no requirement to disclose total finance charges or even the
number of payments. Those details are left to the original credit
agreement, which need not be attached. Thus, the total financial
burden is not revealed.
A more important innovation of the Bills is the requirement that
the debtor fill out an updated income and expense statement at the
time of reaffirmation. If that updated budget shows too little money
for reaffirmation payments, the reaffirmation would be rebuttably
presumed an undue hardship, unless the creditor is a credit union,8
for sixty days after the agreement is filed with the Court. The debtor
could attempt to rebut the presumption by submitting a written
statement "identifying additional sources of funds to make the
[reaffirmation] payments."83 The Bankruptcy Court would review
these presumptively undue hardship reaffirmations, even if the
debtor's counsel had certified that the debtor would be able to make
the payments. If the Court failed to disapprove the reaffirmation
within sixty days, it would presumably become fully effective. The
Bills would allow the Court to disapprove a reaffirmation if the
presumption is not satisfactorily rebutted, but only upon notice and
hearing to debtor and creditor, and the hearing must be held before
discharge.
All other reaffirmations approved by debtor's counsel become
effective as soon as they are filed with the Court. The Bankruptcy
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
80. Id.
81. The Bills also provide that even if the disclosures are incorrect, the
reaffirmation will be enforceable if the disclosures were made in good faith. See §§
203 of H.R. 333 and S. 420, amending 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), by adding new subsection
(1)(3).
82. The undue hardship provisions would not apply when the creditor is a credit
union. A reaffirmation between a credit union and a represented debtor would
become effective as soon as it is signed by the parties, certified by debtor's counsel
and filed with the court. See §§ 203 of H.R. 333 and S. 420, adding new subsection
(m) to Code § 524.
83. Id.
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Court would apparently have no power to review and disapprove
reaffirmations that debtor's counsel approves, except where the
undue hardship presumption applies.
Additional judicial attention to reaffirmation's impact on the
debtor's budget is a good idea. Giving the judge the final say on
reaffirmations that seem to bust the budget would let the Court
handle the job that many attorneys find too difficult-saying "No" to
a fearful and insistent client. The presumption of undue hardship
might even make reaffirmation more affordable in some cases.
Rather than wait to find out if a proposed agreement will pass
muster, some creditors may reduce the price enough to avoid the
presumption in the first place.
There are problems, however. First, the presumption is
triggered only by a monthly payment that seems too high. Again, the
focus is only on an easy monthly payment, not whether the deal
makes overall financial sense. Moreover, the presumption could be
avoided in ways that do not reduce the price. For example, the
creditor could just reduce the amount and increase the number of
monthly payments. With interest, this raises, rather than lowers,
total cost.
Second, the delay and extra cost might tempt the debtor and
creditor to avoid the presumption by fabricating the figures on the
updated budget. If they made the numbers conform, the debtor
would never need to write an explanation and the reaffirmation
would never go to the judge at all.' Maybe debtor's counsel would
catch this, but counsel seldom has independent knowledge of the
debtor's post-filing financial situation. It might be better to trigger
the presumption using Schedules I and J,85 which are prepared with
help from counsel rather than the interested creditor. Then the
debtor's written explanation could clarify what had changed since the
schedules were filed.
84. Many of these criticisms of the Bill's reaffirmation provisions were first
raised by Bankruptcy Judge Eugene Wedoff of the Northern District of Illinois, in
an oral presentation at the April 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Bankruptcy
Institute in Washington, D.C. See, e.g. Inside ABI, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32,32 (Feb.
2001) (providing a summary of the topics Judge Wedoff would address at the annual
meeting).
85. BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS 960-63 (West Law
School Ed. 2001).
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Another problem is that the Bills allow creditors to collect
payments on a reaffirmation agreement even before it has been filed
with the court.86 Creditors have shown willingness in the past to deal
with debtors directly on reaffirmations and then refuse to file them
with the court,' thus bypassing all required oversight from counsel
and Court. The authorization to collect payments on unfiled
agreements may only encourage this behavior.
Thus, the House and Senate Bills would increase creditor
control of retention in Chapter 7, by raising the price of redemption
and eliminating any right to ride-through, so that more debtors
would have to seek the creditor's agreement to a reaffirmation. The
Bills would counter this additional leverage somewhat by requiring
judicial approval of some reaffirmations even if approved by debtor's
counsel. These changes would make it harder to retain property in
Chapter 7. That would be consistent with the Bills' general aim to
make Chapter 7 less attractive, both absolutely and relative to
Chapter 13. It is not, however, consistent with facilitating retention
in Chapter 7 of property needed for the fresh start.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
Perhaps the interests of all relevant parties could be protected by
making retention in Chapter 7 more predictable and affordable to
debtors, rather than less so, and by easing the burden on their
counsel by reducing the variables.
This Article began with a discussion of retention's benefits,
showing that repossession causes lost value to both debtor and
creditor where the debtor has the highest and best use for the
collateral and could pay more than liquidation value to the creditor
for retention." If retention facilitates the debtor's fresh start,
encouraging and enabling her to become and remain a more
productive worker, then the benefits extend beyond the immediate
parties to the economy as a whole.
Making retention more predictable and affordable in Chapter 7
86. See §§ 202 of H.R. 333 and S. 420, adding new subsection (1) to Code § 524.
87. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
88. See Whitford, The Appropriate Role of Security Interests in Consumer
Transactions, supra note 8.
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will require reducing creditor control of the process, and often,
reducing the price and setting other terms by rule rather than
negotiation. The suggestions below are not new, although they may
not have appeared in this particular constellation before.
A. Ride-Through
First, as recommended by the NBRC, ride-through should be
made a matter of right, at least for debts secured by the debtor's
principal residence.89 This would continue the prevailing pattern in
the home mortgage arena, and would assure debtors who were
current on home mortgage payments that they could retain their
homes for no more than the original contract price. Debtors who
were current at time of filing can probably afford post-petition
payments as well. Barring loss of job, the debtor should be even
more able to do so after the discharge eliminated many other claims
on her income.
Whether the right should extend to more mobile and more
depreciable collateral, and include cure of defaults are closer
questions. As noted earlier, our reaffirmation study indicated that
many motor vehicle lenders permitted ride-through even where the
law of the circuit did not require it.' In any event, creditors could,
and probably would, permit ride-through for other debtors and other
collateral, especially when that afforded them a decent opportunity
at to collect more than other retention methods might yield. Further,
ride-through may stay attractive to debtors for even though the
debtor has to pay the whole unpaid balance to release the lien by
ride-through, she need not reinstate personal liability. If the
payments become too burdensome, she risks at most loss of the
collateral, but not a deficiency judgment.
B. Redemption
A second change is one that Professors Jean Braucher and
89. See NBRC REPORT, supra note 19, at 165-68.
90. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. See generally Culhane &
White, supra note 3.
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William Whitford have long urged: let Chapter 7 debtors, like their
Chapter 13 counterparts, redeem by installments.9 Giving the debtor
the right to redeem over time would greatly increase redemption's
usefulness. Setting the redemption price, interest rate, and maximum
term by statute would let debtors and their counsel know in advance
of filing whether the debtor could afford to retain her assets, and
should make it easier to avoid unduly burdensome deals.
The payout period should be capped, perhaps at five years for
motor vehicles and mobile homes, and three years for other items.
Redemption's price should also be capped at the lesser of the unpaid
balance or the value of the collateral, plus interest. An appropriate
measure of personal property collateral value for redemption
purposes would be wholesale replacement cost, as the NBRC
recommended.' To avoid undue incentives to file, it might be best to
except from that rule motor vehicles and mobile homes purchased
within a year before filing. No strip down would be allowed there.
Wholesale replacement cost is higher than liquidation value,93
but is less than or equal to the debtor's replacement cost. Wholesale
price lists are widely available for used motor vehicles and some
other major consumer collateral. Thus, this pricing measure is more
predictable and less fact-intensive than Rash's version of replacement
cost,9' and more affordable than the full retail replacement rule in the
proposed legislation. It is important to have predictable pricing and
91. See Braucher, Increasing Uniformity, supra note 14, at 23; see also, William
Whitford, Has the Time Come to Repeal Chapter 13?, 65 IND. L.J. 85 (1989). While
Professors Jean Braucher and William Whitford both have advocated allowing
installment redemption in Chapter 7, neither necessarily subscribes to the details set
out here.
92. The NBRC did not recommend installment redemption in Chapter 7. See
NBRC REPORT, supra note 19, at 243-56. However, the NBRC recommended
capping the reaffirmation price at wholesale replacement cost for personal property
and at fair market value, less hypothetical costs of sale, for real property. Id The
NBRC would also have amended § 506 to require these measures of collateral value
for all purposes in individual Chapter 7 and 13 cases. Id.
93. Even though creditors often dispose of repossessed collateral by wholesaling
it, wholesale replacement cost exceeds liquidation value. Wholesale replacement
cost is the cost to purchase in the wholesale market. The repossessing creditor does
not net that much, since it has to take into account the costs of retaking and reselling
the collateral.
94. See supra note 73.
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not encourage litigation where the debtor cannot afford discovery
and other expenses.
Installment redemption should require the debtor to reinstate
personal liability for the redemption price. This would be less
onerous than redemption in Chapter 13, where the debtor must give
up all disposable income for three years and retain personal liability
on all claims until the entire plan is finished. Since Chapter 7 debtors
would not need to pay a trustee or unsecured creditors while
redeeming, they would be more likely to complete redemption
payments.
Creditors would be protected in several ways. First, there is the
partial renewal of personal liability. Second, any insurance required
under the original contract would have to be maintained. Third, the
redemption price should be fully amortized, without balloon
payments, over the chosen term. Fourth, since the automatic stay
ends quickly in Chapter 7, repossession could be attempted more
quickly than in Chapter 13, if the debtor failed to pay.
While wholesale replacement cost would often allow retention
for less than the unpaid balance, and less than the reaffirmation
prices common under current law, the debtor would still need
protection from improvident actions. Approval from counsel or the
Court should be required on the undue hardship and best interests
standards currently in use, and something like the presumption of
undue hardship procedure in the House and Senate bills might be
added.
Use of wholesale prices, a maximum term, and a predictable
interest rate, however, would ease counsel's and the Court's burden
of assessing total cost. A further aid to that assessment would be
additional disclosure of the true costs of the credit. There maybe
little hope that more disclosure alone would deter desperate debtors.
However, it should help debtor's counsel and the Court determine
whether the debtor can bear the retention cost, as well as whether it
exceeds replacement cost. For these reasons, requiring more
disclosure in retention agreements is preferable.
In the cases where redemption would exceed the budget or
otherwise threaten the fresh start, these rules should make it easier
for counsel and Court to say "No." The limited term should also
reduce the danger that the debtor would still owe years of payments
on a car or washing machine when the asset's useful life ends.
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Finally, installment redemption at wholesale replacement cost should
limit the leverage value of security interests in low-value household
goods.
C. Residual Reaffirmation
Ride-through and redemption, as outlined above, should cover
all retention of collateral cases. However, there may be some
situations where reaffirmation of an unsecured claim would be in the
debtor's best interests. For example, a creditor may have a well-
founded claim for exception to discharge, but offer to settle for less
than defense costs and the likely judgment. If debtor's counsel and
the Court are convinced that the creditor has a good chance of
success and the will to pursue the complaint, reaffirmation on
reasonable terms might be allowed. A second instance might be
where the debtor wants to reaffirm to protect a cosigner.95 In most
cases, however, voluntary payment without reinstatement of personal
liability is the most appropriate method of handling those unsecured
debts that the debtor is willing to pay.
D. Restore Judicial Supervision
A third recommendation is that Congress restore, with some
modification, the role the Bankruptcy Court originally played when
debtors wanted to take on personal liability for prepetition debt.
Under the 1978 Code,96 the Court, not the debtor's counsel, assessed
whether such agreements posed an undue hardship and were in the
best interest of the debtor and the debtor's dependents. This
procedure implicitly recognized that these questions raise factual,
legal and policy issues most appropriately decided by an impartial
judicial officer rather than by the debtor's advocate and counselor.
Moreover, the 1978 Code appropriately placed the burden of
implementing society's interest in the fresh start policy - sometimes
over the protests of a particular debtor - on the shoulders of the
95. In our empirical study, we were surprised to find that debtors did not
reaffirm a greater percentage of cosigned debts than those without a cosigner. See
Culhane & White, supra note 3, at 735-36.
96. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (revised Nov. 6, 1978).
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judiciary rather than the debtor's lawyer.
Debtors' attorneys have not been effective guardians of the fresh
start policy.7 This fact, as well as recent revelations of widespread
abuse of the reaffirmation process, has already led many bankruptcy
courts to review reaffirmations even if they have the blessing of
debtor's counsel.98 Indeed, one court speculated that the absence of
judicial oversight fostered the climate allowing abuse of the
reaffirmation process to flourish.99
Ordinarily a lawyer is ethically bound to abide by a client's
decisions regarding the objectives of the representation and to
represent her client zealously in attempting to achieve them.1"
97. See Culhane & White, supra note 3, at 758-63.
98. Among the cases asserting power to override approval of reaffirmations by
debtor's counsel are BankBoston N.A. v. Nanton, 239 B.R. 419 (D. Mass. 1999)
(listing cases on both sides of the issue); In re Vargas, 257 B.R. 157 (Bankr. D.N.J.
2001); In re Collins, 243 B.R. 217 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000); Melendez 11, 235 B.R. 173
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1999); In re Lindley, 216 B.R. 811 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998);
Melendez 1, 224 B.R. 252 (Bankr. D. Mass 1998); In re Turner, 208 B.R. 434 (Bankr.
C.D. 111. 1997); In re Hovestadt, 193 B.R. 382 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996). This view is
not unanimous. Robert Hessling, in his treatise Reaffirmation and Redemption,
states that a majority of courts have recognized a lack of power to approve or
disapprove of reaffirmations in these circumstances. ROBERT A. HESSLING,
REAFFIRMATION AND REDEMPTION (1994). In re Pendlebury is an example of that
view:
Congress' intent that the court rely upon the declaration and affidavit filed by
counsel is made manifest under the 1984 amendments by removal of the
requirement of court approval except as to reaffirmation agreements entered
into by pro se debtors. In practice reaffirmation hearings presently serve no
useful purpose except for debtors filing pro se. Attorneys are rightly charged
with the responsibility for advising their clients during the reaffirmation
process.
In re Pendlebury, 94 B.R. 120, 124 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988).
Other cases holding that the Bankruptcy Court has no power to override counsel's
approval of a reaffirmation agreement include In re Sweet, 954 F.2d 610 (10th Cir.
1992); In re Bauer, No. 97-13034-SSM, 1997 WL 752652 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997); In
re French, 185 B.R. 910 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995); In re Grinnell, 170 B.R. 495
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1994); In re Dabbs, 128 B.R. 307 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991); In re
Wallace, 102 B.R. 54 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989); see also Cox v. Zale Del., 239 F.3d 910
(7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the judge cannot disallow reaffirmations that debtor's
counsel approved) (dicta).
99. In re Izzo, 197 B.R. 11, 12, n.2 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996).
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr AND RESPONSIBILITY 1.2(a), 1.3
(1983); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSIBILrrY 7-101(A)(1); EC 7-76; 7-8
BUT CAN SHE KEEP THE CAR
Current procedure casts the debtor's lawyer in an in loco parentis
relationship with her client.01 This role is foreign to attorneys
accustomed to acting as the client's advocate and counselor. It
requires the lawyer to override the client's lawful, but unwise,
objective of taking on personal liability for a prepetition debt.
Placing the lawyer in a position adverse to her own client has
proved to be ineffective in safeguarding the discharge and in
implementing the fresh start policy. Lawyers and bankruptcy judges
should be restored to the roles each performs best, those of advocate
and adjudicator respectively.
This proposal comes at a price. Judicial oversight and approval,
however, need not entail formal courtroom hearings in every case.
Use of standardized official forms, together with full disclosure of the
credit terms and the debtor's current disposable income, would
streamline judicial supervision. In many instances, this information
would provide the Court with an adequate basis for making the
undue hardship and best interest determinations after only an in-
chambers review. Moreover, if the debtor is given the right to
redeem collateral in installments, cases requiring more than an in-
chambers review may be relatively few because such commitments
are likely to be more affordable if the debt is reduced to the
wholesale value of the collateral. If, however, this review suggested
that taking on personal liability might be improvident, a hearing,
though not necessarily one in which the debtor physically appears
before the judge, would be held. Telephonic hearings may well be
adequate in many cases. Bankruptcy judges should be given latitude
to develop local rules of practice setting forth the circumstances in
which a courtroom hearing would be required.
V. CONCLUSION
Chapter 7 debtors often need to retain some items of collateral.
They should be permitted to do so where they can pay the creditor
more than liquidation value without unduly burdening their budgets.
Current Chapter 7 retention procedures, however, fail to strike the
(1980).
101. In order for a person to be considered in loco parentis, he or she must
have intentionally assumed the rights and duties of a parent or guardian.
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appropriate balance, and debtors often bind themselves to pay too
much. The proposed legislation would not do enough to counter
creditor leverage in Chapter 7.
Both debtors and creditors would be better served by
recognizing a debtor's right to ride-through on some collateral,
allowing installment redemption at predictable cost for other items,
and increasing the Court's role in the process. These proposals
would facilitate retention of collateral in Chapter 7 with much less
danger to the fresh start, and would still return more to secured
creditors than they could obtain by repossession. That prevents
lost value and is beneficial to all parties.
